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NOTES
Criminal Law: Diagram of a Drug Sentence - Defining
"Mixture or Substance" on the Basis of Utility in United
States v. Richards
L Introduction
Ancient civilizations contemplated the ideal attributes of justice with prophetic
clarity. The Egyptian story of final judgment provides a particularly instructive
example.' According to Egyptian religious doctrine, souls of the deceased presented
their hearts to the deity Anubis The heart was then weighed on a scale opposite a
single feather in the Hall of Two Truths If the heart was lighter than the feather,
the soul was judged to be pure.4 The story suggests the Egyptians understood the
heart to be the essential element of human good or evil. Therefore, the lifeless mortal
body was irrelevant to the calculation of salvation or damnation. Its inclusion would
simply corrupt a fair and uniform belief in the method of final judgment.
Although centuries old, the tale frames an unresolved criminal sentencing issue in
the American justice system. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,' narcotics
offenders are subject to mandatory minimum sentences for possession of "a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount" of illegal drugs.' Defining the
allowable contents of a "mixture or substance" marks the point of controversy.
According to judicial interpretations, "mixture or substance" may include: (1) any
substance chemically bonded to the pure drug;7 (2) any substance chemically bonded
to the pure drug for the purpose of facilitating street sales;8 or (3) any ingestible
substance chemically bonded to the pure drug." Building upon the Egyptian analogy,
American courts are confused about what to place on the scale opposite the feather.
The figurative "heart" at issue is the mixture or substance of illegal narcotics.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit first considered the issue
in United States v. Richards. Larry Richards was arrested while chemically
synthesizing methamphetamines through a process which yields the drug in a liquid
1. See ALAN W. SHORTER, THE EGYPTIAN GODS 54 (1937).
2. See THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 884 (Gramercy Books 1979) (1855).
3. See SHORTER, supra note 1, at 54.
4. See id.
5. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 21 U.S.C.).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
7. The First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal apply this plain meaning approach.
8. The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal apply this functional approach.
9. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal apply this consumption approach.
10. 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 117 S. C. 540 (1996).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
wastewater solution. Although the amount of ingestible or marketable drug in the
mixture weighed only twenty-eight grams, the entire solution weighed thirty-two
kilograms. As sentences are based upon drug weight, Larry Richards would spend
a difference of decades in prison depending on the Tenth Circuit's characterization
of a "mixture or substance."
Two conflicting policies shaped the controversy for the Tenth Circuit. Legislative
history to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 reveals that Congress intended to render
federal drug sentences based upon the form of narcotics as they appear in the
marketplace. 2 In other words, base sentencing weights should include carrier
mediums, or substances chemically bonded to the pure drug to enhance marketability
or consumption. However, this market-oriented approach conflicts with the objective
of uniform sentencing advanced by the United States Sentencing Commission (the
Sentencing Commission). Absolute uniformity is only possible where base
sentencing weight includes the pure drug alone. Substances chemically bonded to the
narcotic may vary in weight, leading to different sentences for essentially the same
offense. Therefore, a balance must be struck between the market-oriented approach
and uniformity objective.
The Tenth Circuit advanced neither policy by sentencing Larry Richards based
upon the entire thirty-two kilogram solution.' The solution was neithei marketable
nor ingestible when seized by law enforcement. Further, adoption of a base
sentencing weight which includes the byproducts of manufacture limits the uniformity
objective beyond the intent of Congress. Basing its decision on Supreme Court
holdings involving entirely different facts," the Tenth Circuit adopted an overly
broad definition of "mixture or substance" which fails to make the necessary
distinction between byproducts of manufacture and carrier mediums used to facilitate
consumption or sale." This note explores the interpretive lapse by the Richards
court.
First, this note will challenge implementatidn of Supreme Court holdings without
contemplation of the underlying rationale. Second, this note will emphasize the
distinction between unmarketable waste materials and carrier agents used to market
the narcotic or facilitate ingestion. Third, this note will criticize the application of
plain meaning definitions in the presence of clear congressional intent. Finally, this
note will endorse a congruent approach which reconciles the objectives of Congress
11. See id. at 1153.
12. See H.R. RaP. No. 99-845, at 11-12, 17 (1986). Congress expressly intended for narcotics
dealers to be punished based on the quantity of diluted drugs actually sold rather than the purity of the
illegal substance. Congress designated this the market-oriented approach. Id.
13. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'W, FEDERAL GUIDELINES MANUAL 2DI.I (1995) [hereinafter
FEDERAL GUIDELINES MANUAL].
14. See Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153.
15. See id at 1157.
16. Carrier mediums are substances chemically bonded with the pure narcotic to assist marketing
or consumption of the narcotic. Dealers use carrier mediums to conceal, transport and distribute a greater
number of drug units. To be classified as a carrier medium, the accompanying substance must place the
drug in marketable form and not require chemical extraction of the narcotic prior to use. See United




and the Sentencing Commission, as well as the reasoning of Supreme Court
precedent.
II. The Law Preceding United States v. Richards
The development of definitive case law regarding the "mixture or substance"
controversy necessarily begins with passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.7
With regard to mandatory minimum sentencing, the Act adopted the market-oriented
approach but failed to clearly define the phrase "mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount (of narcotics)."'" Without a clear definition of "mixture or
substance," courts lacked the legislative guidance to distinguish between byproducts
of manufacture and carrier mediums used to facilitate consumption or sale. The
United States Sentencing Commission9 attempted clarification, proposing mandatory
minimum sentences based upon the entire weight of a mixture or substance."
The Supreme Court addressed the "mixture or substance" controversy2 in
Chapman v. United States.' This case involved a mandatory minimum sentence
calculation based upon lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and its carrier medium'
The Supreme Court agreed with the Sentencing Commission that the entire weight
of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount (of narcotics)" determined
the sentence, based upon adherence to a plain meaning interpretation of "mixture or
substance."'24 The Court further held the construction consistent with the congres-
sional market-oriented approach.'
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that Congress intended
to address narcotics as they would be sold on the streets. 6 Blotter paper "makes
LSD easier to transport, store, conceal and sell. It is a tool of the trade for those who
traffic in the drug, and therefore it was rational for Congress to set penalties based
17. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 21 U.S.C.).
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. The Sentencing Commission was a component of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3625, 3673, 3742, and 28
U.S.C. § 991-998 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
20. The current application notes instructed "in Case of a mixture or substance containing
methamphetamine, use the offense level determined by the entire weight of the mixture or substance."
See Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153.
21. See supra note 16.
22. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
23. See id. at 453. Minute dosages of pure LSD are typically dissolved and sprayed onto blotter
paper for retail distribution. The paper is then cut into squares for ingestion. Id.
24. Id. at 454. Mixture was defined as "a portion of matter consisting of two or more components
that do not bear a fixed proportion to one another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded
as retaining a separate existence." Id. at 462 (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1449 (1986)). The Court also defined mixture as "two substances blended together so that the particles
of one are diffused among the particles of the other." Id. (citing 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 921
(2d ed. 1989)). The court noted that packaging materials were not within the dictionary definition of a
mixture. See id. at 462-63.
25. See id. at 461.
26. See id. at 465.
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on this chosen tool."' Because blotter paper was a carrier agent used to facilitate
the retail distribution and consumption of LSD, inclusion of its weight in sentencing
would provide greater deterrence in the actual marketplace. '
Justice Marshall joined Justice Stevens in a dissent criticizing divergence from
uniform sentencing.2 Focusing on relative culpability, Justice Stevens argued that
a dealer who happens to use a heavier blotter paper should not receive a more severe
punishment than a dealer who distributes a greater quantity of the pure drug3
Recognizing the possibility of widespread sentencing disparities, the Sentencing
Commission amended the commentary to United States Sentencing Guideline 2D1.1
following Chapman." The amendment excluded from sentence calculation any
materials requiring separation from the controlled substance prior to use. The
Supreme Court then considered the relationship between the Chapman holding and
the commentary amendment to the Guidelines in Neal v. United States.3
The petitioner in Neal was also sentenced based upon the total weight of LSD and
a carrier medium under facts similar to Chapman.m ' Following the commentary
amendment to the Guidelines, the petitioner filed a motion to modify his sentence in
the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.35 The district
court refused to modify the sentence, ' and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed." The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts,
rejecting the argument that priority should be given to the more specific Guidelines
rather than the general statutory construction in Chapman." The Court instead relied
upon the doctrine of stare decisis to preserve the Chapman interpretation and include
substances chemically bonded to the pure drug in sentence calculations.3"
Emerging conflict between the Supreme Court and the Sentencing Commission
placed congressional intentions at apparent odds. Congress created the Sentencing
Commission in 1984 to provide for uniform sentences. Congress then mandated a
market-oriented approach in 1986, which would inevitably result in sentencing
disparities. The absence of clarity has led to three different interpretations among
27. Id. at 466.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. See id. at 473 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. See FEDERAL GUIDEIUNES MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2D1.1 amend. 488). The commentary
listed "waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance" as an example
of excluded materials in the sentencing calculations, I.
32. See id.
33. 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996).
34. See id. at 763.
35. See id. at 765.
36. See United States v. Neal, 846 F. Supp. 1362 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
37. See United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1995).
38. See Neal, 116 S. Ct. at 766.
39. See id. at 768-69. The Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of stare decisis based upon the
authority of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992) and Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v.




federal appellate courts, forcing a choice between uniformity, market-oriented
sentencing or a balance between the objectives.
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal follow the consumption
approach, which limits the base sentencing weight to ingestible "mixtures or
substances."'" The consumption approach conforms to market-orientation because
sentences are rendered based upon the form of the drug immediately prior to use.
However, the consumption approach is underinclusive because it overlooks a mixture
or substance which may assist in transportation or concealment of the narcotic but
not consumption.
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal address the oversight by
expanding the definition of "mixture or substance" to include any chemically bonded
material which assists retail marketability in some sense.4 This functional approach
includes both ingestible and non-ingestible carrier mediums, most accurately
reflecting the market-oriented intentions of Congress. Uniformity is sacrificed to a
greater extent under the functional approach, however, because a wider range of
materials may be included in the base sentencing weight. Nonetheless, the functional
approach appears to recognize congressional intent while balancing a uniformity
objective.
Finally, the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal apply a plain meaning
definition to "mixture or substance."43 Relying on dictionary definitions where clear
statutory language is absent, this plain meaning approach includes in base sentencing
weight any material chemically bonded with the pure drug. Application of the plain
meaning approach in Richards failed to advance uniformity or market-orientation
objectives. While the market-orientation objective only contemplates the inclusion
of carrier mediums used to facilitate consumption or sale, the plain meaning approach
excessively includes any substance chemically bonded to the drug. The broader
inclusion of any possible bonding substance necessarily results in greater sentencing
disparities. Accordingly, the Richards decision reflects the danger of applying
dictionary definitions without careful consideration of policy underpinnings and the
specific facts at issue.
III. Onslaught of a National Methamphetamine Epidemic
Methamphetamine is the particular narcotic at issue in United States v. Richards,
making the case particularly significant in Oklahoma and the Midwest. Metham-
phetamine is a potent central nervous system stimulant." Otherwise known as speed
40. See supra notes 7-9.
41. See United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d
129 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (1lth Cir. 1991).
42. See United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d
999 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992).
43. See United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mahecha-Onofre,
936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Baker, 883 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1989).
44. See Angie Cannon, Justice Department Cracks Down on Meth in Midwest, Rockies, DENVER
POST, Sept. 27, 1996, at A9.
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or crank, the narcotic accelerates heart rate, elevates blood pressure and increases
body temperature to produce a euphoric sensation.4 Immediate side effects include
irritability, paranoia, and nervousness.' One Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
officer characterized the user of methamphetamines as an individual who "mows his
lawn at 3 a.m."'17
Arrests for methamphetamine related offenses have tripled in the Midwest and
Rocky Mountain region since 1992, resulting in a sense of recent urgency by the
Justice Department.'5 In fact, the same day judgment was rendered in United States
v. Richards, newspapers reported the arrests of a prominent Oklahoma City television
anchor 9 and suburban Tulsa police chief' for possession and distribution of
methamphetamines. Therefore, the sentencing procedures analyzed in United States
v. Richards have immediate relevance to Oklahoma law enforcement.
IV. Statement of the Case
In Richards, law enforcement officials arrested Larry D. Richards for possession
of a liquid mixture containing detectable amounts of a controlled substance."' Police
seized the thirty-two kilogram solution before Richards could separate twenty-eight
grams of usable pure methamphetamine suspended in the liquid. 2 On August 10,
1990, Richards pled guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance with inteni to
distribute.' The charge carried a mandatory minimum prison term of ten years.'
45. See id. The drug is commonly ingested by inhalation, injection, or swallowing.
46. See id.
47. George F. Will, Levees Against the Drug Storm, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 17, 1996, at A14.
Discussing the widespread accessibility of methamphetamine, Will noted the recipe is available on the
Internet. See id.
48. See Phillip Brashear, Midwest Targeted in Justice Department Anti-Drug Campaign,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 26, 1996. Attorney General Janet Reno announced a coordination of efforts
including public education, shared intelligence on drug traffickers and special law enforcement training
in 14 states. Id.
49. See Ed Godfrey, Ex-TV Anchor Pleads Guilty To Drug Charge, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 28,
1996, at 14. Jerry Adams pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute,
receiving in exchange a five-year deferred sentence. Adams anchored newscasts in the Oklahoma City
market since 1974.
50. See Mark A. Hutchison, Police ChiefAccused of Stealing Drugs, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 28,
1996, at 14. Collinsville police chief Donald Abel was suspended without pay after he was arrested for
allegedly stealing a gram of methamphetamine from a police evidence locker. Federal authorities claimed
Abel then attempted to exchange the drugs for sex with a former police dispatcher.
51. See United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1153 (10th Cir. 1996).
52. See id. Synthesis of the narcotic yields a liquid solution. Methamphetamine is then extracted
from the mixture for distribution in powder form, leaving a waste water byproduct.
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994). "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance ..... Id.
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(viii) (1994). "(A)ny person who violates subsection (a) of this
section involving (viii) 1 kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine ... shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years




The United States District Court for the District of Utah applied Sentencing
Guideline 2Dl.155 and sentenced Richards to 188 months imprisonment. The court
based the sentence upon the entire thirty-two kilogram mixture rather than the amount
of pure methamphetamine. 6 Richards then filed two motions to vacate his
sentence,' the second of which was granted by the district court."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the motion an abuse of discretion and
reversed." However, the court noted that a pending amendment to the commentary
of Sentencing Guideline 2D1.1 afforded Richards relief if adopted and applied
retroactively.' As discussed in Chapman, the amendment would exclude from
sentence calculation waste materials requiring separation from the pure drug prior to
use.6 The Sentencing Commission amended the commentary effective November
1, 1993,2 expressly making the amendment retroactive.6
Based on the amended commentary to Sentencing Guideline 2D1.1, Richards
returned to the district court seeking a reduction in his sentence from 188 months to
sixty months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)." The government challenged the
reduction, arguing that the amended commentary failed to alter the actual definition
of "mixture or substance" in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.' Absent the change in
construction, the government asserted that Richards' sentence must be no less than
120 months under the Act.
The district court, however, reduced Richards' sentence to sixty months, reasoning
that Sentencing Guideline 2D1.1 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act should receive a
congruent interpretation to avoid inconsistent results.' A divided panel of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, embracing the lower court's congruent approach and
refusing to sentence Richards based on the entire thirty-two kilogram solution.' The
Tenth Circuit reasoned that the market-oriented approach contemplated by Congress
prohibited the treatment of unusable drug mixtures as usable.'
55. See supra note 18.
56. See Richards v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1456, 1457 (D. Utah 1992). Adding additional local
significance, Richards was incarcerated at El Reno, Oklahoma.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994). A prisoner claiming his sentence exceeded the maximum
authorized by law "may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence." l
58. See Richards, 796 F. Supp. at 1457.
59. See United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1370 (10th Cir. 1993).
60. See id. at 1371.
61. See id.
62. See supra note 18.
63. See FEDERAL GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 13, at IB1.10(c).
64. See United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531, 1532 (10th Cir. 1995). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act
provides a mandatory minimum five-year prison term for possession with intent to manufacture 10 grams
or more of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (1994).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
66. See Richards, 67 F.3d at 1532.
67. See id. at 1537.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1536.
1998]
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals then granted en banc review to determine the
controlling definition of "mixture or substance."7 Writing for the majority, Judge
Baldock held that any substance chemically bonded to the pure drug should be
included in base sentencing weight.7' Although Chapman only considered a carrier
medium used to facilitate sale or consumption, the Tenth Circuit held Chapman
controlling under the doctrine of stare decisis n The majority further rejected the
market-oriented approach, citing "detectable amount" (rather than ingestible or
marketable amount) as the hallmark of a "mixture or substance."" Finally, the
majority rejected the authority of the Sentencing Commission to affect judicial
statutory constructions. '
Writing for the dissent, Chief Judge Seymour accused the majority of divorcing
the holding in Chapman from its "underlying circumstances and rationale to produce
a result which in this case is directly at odds with that rationale."'7 The dissent
reasoned that although the methamphetamine solution at issue fit the dictionary
definition of "mixture or substance," the majority had produced a ruling in conflict
with congressional intent.76 Additionally, the dissent cited authority from a majority
of appellate courts which refused to treat unusable mixtures as usable." The dissent
concluded with an endorsement of the Sentencing Commission's amended commen-
tary, suggesting a congruent ruling which places the Sentencing Guidelines in
agreement with congressional intent."
V. Analysis
A. Inappropriate Application of Supreme Court Definitions
Supreme Court holdings cannot properly be applied to a given set of facts without
initial consideration of the Court's underlying rationale. As suggested by Chief Judge
Seymour, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the definition of "mixture or
substance" beyond the scope of Chapman and Neal. Although a solution of
methamphetamine and waste water seems analogous to LSD and blotter paper within
the proposed definition, Richards presents a factual distinction prohibiting such
application and revisiting the focal issue of congressional intent.
As previously discussed, a single dose of LSD is so minute that it must be reduced
to liquid form and sprayed on a carrier medium of blotter paper. The paper facilitates
marketability by concealing the drug, and the paper may be directly ingested.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court developed its interpretation of "mixture or
70. See United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1152 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 540
(1996).
71. See id. at 1157.
72. See id at 1156-57.
73. See id. at 1158.
74. See id. at 1157.
75. Id. at 1158.
76. See id.
77. See id. at i159-60.




substance" with facts clearly contemplated by the congressional market-oriented
approach. In contrast, the methamphetamine seized in Richards was awaiting
extraction from a waste water solution. The solution was neither marketable nor
ingestible in its current phase of production, so the Supreme Court holdings were
inapplicable.
At the time Chapman and Neal were considered, the Court was not compelled to
distinguish carrier mediums from waste materials because only a carrier medium was
before the Court. In Richards, it was inadequate to merely adopt this analysis from
previous Supreme Court holdings. It was the responsibility of the Tenth Circuit to
consider the unique factual circumstances, advance the analysis and make the
necessary distinction required to maintain the intent of Congress.
B. Carrier Mediums Distinguished from Waste Materials
The majority of United States Courts of Appeal have recognized that Congress
intended to elevate mandatory minimum sentences only in the presence of a carrier
medium used to facilitate sale or ingestion of a controlled substance. As such, these
courts have excluded waste materials from the statutory construction of "mixture or
substance." Despite the Tenth Circuit's position, the prevailing view simply refuses
to include worthless byproducts in a sentencing scheme based upon market-
orientation.
Cases factually similar to Richards have consistently excluded the weight of waste
water from sentencing determinations. In United States v. Johnson,' the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that waste water from a cocaine solution failed to increase the
amount of drug available at the retail level.' In a particularly instructive
hypothetical, the court questioned the fate of a marijuana farmer who harvested his
crop and dropped a few of the illegal plants on the ground. If the farmer then plowed
his field and mixed traces of the plants into the soil, "would the farmer be
accountable for all the marijuana harvested as well as the weight of the topsoil?'"'
Obviously the results of such a sentence would be preposterous, but the extreme
nature of the example reflects the immense potential for complete absence of
uniformity if the market-oriented approach is disregarded.
In United States v. Jennings,"2 the defendant was apprehended for possession
of a methamphetamine mixture found cooking in a Crockpot 3 The Sixth Circuit
held that inclusion of the liquid waste materials in sentencing calculation "would
both produce an illogical result and be contrary to the legislative intent underlying
the statute."" The defendant was not attempting to increase the amount of
methamphetamine available for- sale with the addition of a carrier medium.
79. 999 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1993).
80. See id. at 1196. Stating the obvious, the court noted that waste water itself has no market value.
Accordingly, there is no rational basis to a sentence based on the entire weight of a useless mixture. See
id.
81. Id.
82. 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991).
83. See id. at 134.
84. Id. at 136.
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Rather, he was distilling the narcotic from otherwise useless byproducts of
manufacture.85 In such circumstances the distinction between a marketable and
useless "mixture or substance" was brought to light.86
In United States v. Rolande-Gabriel," the Eleventh Circuit held the inclusion
of waste materials irrational to sentence calculation." The Third Circuit agreed
in United States v. Rodriguez,89 ruling that a combination of cocaine and boric
acid did not constitute a "mixture or substance."' The Third Circuit likened the
boric acid to a container or packaging material, which Chapman expressly
excluded from weight calculation."
The argument may be advanced that packaging materials are functionally
equivalent to carrier mediums. However, packaging materials may suspend or
house the narcotic in a non-marketable state. Carrier agents, in contrast, are
mixed with the drug to assist retail distribution or ease ingestion. The tendency
of courts to treat packaging materials the same as waste materials based upon
their mutual absence of marketability is further illustrated by authority from the
Second Circuit.
2
For example, creme liqueur may provide a solvent for cocaine during temporary
transportation.93 To reduce the cocaine to a marketable or ingestible state, it must
first be distilled from the creme liqueur.' Congressional rationale warrants
penalizing the defendant for the entire amount of the mixture only after the
cocaine reaches marketable form.95 In contrast, blotter paper and other carrier
mediums are necessary to the distribution and consumption of LSD and
appropriately included in the sentencing weight under a market-oriented ap-
proach.6
Materials chemically bonded to facilitate consumption or marketability of the
pure drug represent controlled substances as they appear on the street. Both the
consumption and functional approaches honor congressional intent for a market-
oriented sentencing scheme. Accordingly, the distinction between consumption
85. See id. at 137. At the time of arrest, Richards was engaged in the same stage of metham-
phetamine production. See United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1153 (10th Cir. 1996).
86. See Jennings, 945 F.2d at 137.
87. 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991).
88. See id. at 1237. The instant cocaine mixture "was not ready for retail at the street-level or for
wholesale by the big-time drug kingpin" and therefore not a carrier agent contemplated by the Supreme
Court. See id.
89. 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992).
90. See id. at 1001.
91. See id. at 1006. "The compressed boric acid was not used ... as a cutting agent.., for the
cocaine such that its proximity to the cocaine here would constitute a 'mixture' as Chapman elucidates
that term." Id. at 1005.
92. See United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992).
93. See id. at 552.
94. See id at 553.
95. See id. at 556-57. The defendant's culpability is based upon the amount of usable drugs brought
to the market, whether operating in wholesale, retail or importation. See id.




and marketability is inconsequential, provided unmarketable and non-consumable
substances are not considered in sentence calculation. The avoidance of a
distinction between ingestion and marketability is based largely on practicality,
as the two concepts overlap. Blotter paper, for example, facilitates marketability
and may be directly consumed. Furthermore, the materials a drug addict might
consume would be difficult to predict at best.
C. Dictionary Reliance and Plain Meaning Interpretation
Despite widespread recognition of the carrier medium and waste material
distinction, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals instead focused upon the plain
meaning interpretation presented by the Supreme Court in Chapman.9 7 According
to the Court, absence of a congressional interpretation of "mixture or substance"
required the application of dictionary definitions. 8 In Chapman, the Court
determined blotter paper and LSD to constitute a mixture under the plain meaning
of the term because the LSD crystals diffused among the fibers of the blotter
paper." The Tenth Circuit applied the same analysis in Richards, reasoning that
liquid byproducts and methamphetamine particles were a "mixture or substance"
by dictionary definition."®
The Tenth Circuit supported its plain meaning analysis by focusing on the
statutory language "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount (of
narcotics).'0 1. In their opinion, "detectable amount"" was the hallmark of a
mixture or substance under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. 3 Absent a limiting
modifier such as "marketable," "consumable" or "usable" in the statutory
language, the entire weight of the methamphetamine solution determined Richards'
sentence. The Tenth Circuit openly admitted the sentencing disparities which
would result from their interpretation, discounting the problem as a responsibility
of the legislative branch to revise statutes.104
The dissent opined, however, that "our job in construing statutes is to effectuate
the intent reflected in the language of the enactment and the legislative
process."'"5 As such, the Tenth Circuit was not required to draft a ruling
demonstrably at odds with congressional intent."
97. See United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1996).
98. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991).
99. See Richards, 87 F.3d at 1155.
100. See id. at 1158. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals further cited Johnson v. Sawyer, 4 F.3d
369, 385 n.82 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling that circuit courts of appeal are bound by the decisions of the
Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of federal statutes).
101. See Richards, 87 F.3d at 1158.
102. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
103. See Richards, 87 F.3d at 1158.
104. See id.
105. Id. (Seymour, C.J., dissenting).
106. See id. (Seymour, CJ., dissenting); see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 242 (1989) (dispelling plain meaning constructions which violate the intent of statutory drafting);
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (cautioning against absurd literal results
where alternative interpretations are consistent with legislative purpose).
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Chief Judge Seymour borrowed the words of Learned Hand to convey the
sentiments of the dissent: "One of the surest indexes of a mature judiciary [is] not
to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have
some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."" It only follows that functional-
ly distinct concepts cannot be placed under the same definitive label. A substance
chemically bonded to a pure drug to facilitate consumption or sale is not the same
"mixture or substance" as an incomplete and unmarketable drug solution in the
early stages of production.
In Chapman, the Supreme Court arrived at a plain meaning definition of
"mixture or substance" in compliance with the congressional market-oriented
approach." s Blotter paper is a carrier agent, which becomes a "mixture or
substance" by dictionary definition when combined with LSD."
Methamphetamine and its liquid byproduct also satisfy the plain meaning
construction of "mixture or substance" but fail to comply with the market-oriented
approach. Therefore, it was improper for the Tenth Circuit to rely upon a
definition provided by the Supreme Court without insuring the "mixture or
substance" at issue was in fact the same. Only in the presence of a carrier
medium used to facilitate sale or ingestion can both the plain meaning
interpretation and market-oriented approach be implemented.
Following the same line of reasoning as the Tenth Circuit, the First Circuit
stretched the limits of Chapman's plain meaning analysis beyond any reasonable
intentions of Congress. In United States v. Restrepo-Contreras,"' the defendant
was arrested for the importation of eleven beeswax statues containing cocaine"'
Although the statues represented a classic example of packaging material, the
First Circuit sentenced the defendant to 360 months in prison based upon the total
twenty-six kilogram weight of the statues."' To arrive at this result and still
recognize the market-oriented approach suggests that Congress anticipated unique
artistic mediums such as the beeswax statue to facilitate the sale or ingestion of
cocaine.
In United States v. Lopez-Gil,"' the First Circuit determined that cocaine
chemically bonded to a fiberglass suitcase constituted a "mixture or substance,"
and accordingly the weight of the entire piece of luggage was used to calculate
the mandatory minimum sentence."4 The First Circuit relied on precedent
involving an acrylic suitcase, but there the court excluded the luggage's metal
107. Richards, 87 F.3d at 1161 (Seymour, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d
737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
108. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465-66 (1991).
109. See id. at 462.
110. 942 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1991).
111. See id. at 97.
112. See id. at 98.
113. 965 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1992).




frames from net weight calculation."5 In his dissent, Judge Brown noted the
possibility that the metal was excluded because it was less chewable than the
fiberglass."6 With a hint of sarcasm, Judge Brown was able to capture the
judicial problems which follow an overly broad interpretation of "mixture or
substance."" 7
The decisions of the First and Tenth Circuits illustrate the limited applicability
of plain meaning analysis only where a carrier medium is present in the "mixture
or substance." Generalization of "mixture or substance" to include unusable waste
or obvious packaging materials leads to precisely the inaccurate statutory
definitions which concerned Learned Hand.
D. An Appeal for Reasonably Compatible Sentences and Objectives
Absolute uniformity in mandatory minimum sentencing is possible only where
the weight of the pure drug alone is considered. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act"'
eliminates absolute uniformity with congressional adoption of the market-oriented
sentencing approach. Under the market-oriented approach, carrier mediums of
different weights will result in varying sentences for sale or possession of the
same drug amounts. The congruent approach strikes a balance between section
841 and the uniformity objective advanced by Sentencing Guideline 2Dl.1,
placing Congress, the Supreme Court and the Sentencing Commission in
agreement. Excluding the weight of waste materials while including the weight
of ingestible or marketable carrier mediums honors congressional intent while
maximizing uniformity under the circumstances.
As previously discussed,"9 the Sentencing Commission altered commentary
to the Guidelines after Chapman to exclude "[m]aterials that must be separated
from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used.
Examples of such materials include . . . waste water from an illicit laboratory
used to manufacture a controlled substance."" The amended language
specifically endorses the exclusion of waste materials from calculation and
accordingly conflicts with the Tenth Circuit in Richards. However, the supportive
strength of the Guidelines to the current analysis depends upon the scope of their
authority.
The Supreme Court in Neal ruled the Sentencing Guidelines incapable of
altering judicial statutory construction.' On other occasions, however, the
Supreme Court has held commentary promulgated by the Sentencing Commission
to be authoritative unless unconstitutional" or a clearly erroneous interpretation
115. See Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 625.
116. See Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d at 1132 (Brown, J., dissenting).
117. See id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
118. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
120. FEDERAL GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 13, at 2DI.1 amend. 488.
121. See Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 766 (1996).
122. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 454 (1991). The Supreme Court dispensed with the
constitutionality issue in Chapman, finding the penalty scheme of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994) supported by
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of the instant guideline." The Court reasoned: "Amended commentary is
binding on the courts even though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior
judicial constructions of a particular guideline cannot prevent the Commission
from adopting a conflicting interpretation that satisfies the standard we set forth
today. ' ' 24
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have generally agreed that while
the commentary does not possess the force of law, it is an "important interpretive
aid entitled to considerable respect."" Courts should defer to commentary if the
guideline interpretation is reasonable" because it constitutes a contemporaneous
explanation by the authors." The Tenth Circuit opposes this position, refusing
to follow amended commentary that is inconsistent with circuit precedent."'
As prior analysis reflects, the intent of Congress and reasoning of the Supreme
Court provided ample guidance for the Tenth Circuit to sentence Richards. The
Sentencing Guidelines were not essential to arrive at the suggested conclusion that
waste materials are excludable from sentencing calculation. Nonetheless, the
amended commentary to the Guidelines are at the very least persuasive influence
of the congressionally intended approach. Given the greatest possible authority
afforded by a court, the commentary is unconditionally controlling."9 Even the
Tenth Circuit has recognized the merits of a congruent approach under analogous
circumstances, suggesting harmony between the Guidelines and' a statutory
interpretation regarding the commission of an offense during the term of a
previously imposed sentence.'"
E. Balance with Unavoidable Inequities
As previously suggested, the inclusion of ingestible or marketable carrier
mediums in base sentencing weights does not result in absolute uniformity. It is
merely a balance between the conflicting congressional intentions of uniformity
and market-orientation in narcotics sentencing. Even under the congruent
a rational basis. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 465, 467-68. It is noteworthy that this rational basis
depended upon maintenance of the market-oriented approach. See id. at 465.
123. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1993); see also United States v. Fountain,
83 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 1996) (defining guideline commentary consistent with the guideline as
controlling).
124. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46.
125. United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 219 (lst Cir. 1992).
126. See United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 855 (3d Cir. 1992).
127. See United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1989).
128. See United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that guideline
interpretations by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals carry the force of law until the Sentencing
Commission or Congress change the actual text of the guideline); see also United States v. Silver, 84
F.3d 1317, 1325 (10th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the Sentencing Commission does not have the authority
to override or amend a statute).
129. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989) (observing that the Guidelines bind
judges and courts in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases).
130. See United States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1128(10th Cir. 1991); see also United States
v. Shorthouse, 7 F.3d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling that the statutory scheme of sentencing, including




approach, one who uses a heavier carrier medium may still receive a lengthier
sentence than a dealer who sells greater quantities of the pure drug. For Congress
to correct this inequity, representatives and senators will have to decide
collectively that uniform sentencing is a greater national priority than attacking
drug dealers with a market-oriented approach. This is unlikely for three reasons.
First and most importantly, the defendants subject to mandatory minimum
sentences have been found guilty of a narcotics offense. Relative culpability is
only a matter of degree. Second, uniformity is observed to a substantial extent by
limiting the definition of "mixture or substance" to carrier mediums used to
facilitate consumption or sale. Divergent sentences resulting from the inclusion
of waste and packaging materials would be excluded from the equation. Third,
the market-oriented approach to the drug trade is more aggressive and politically
appealing than a sentencing scheme based only upon the weight of the pure drug.
With the Justice Department embarking on regional programs to combat
methamphetamine distribution throughout Oklahoma and the Midwest, the market-
oriented approach is a necessary response to a growing problem. Nevertheless,
some measure of uniformity may be maintained while observing the intentions of
Congress, the Supreme Court and the Sentencing Commission.
VL Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to recognize the necessary distinction
between carrier mediums and waste materials in United States v. Richards.
Accordingly, the court expanded the scope of a section 841 "mixture or
substance" beyond the intention of Congress, the Supreme Court or the
Sentencing Commission. Narcotics sentences were intended to include the weight
of carrier mediums used to facilitate sale or ingestion, not the weight of waste
materials or their equivalents. A sentencing scheme based upon market-orientation
must by its plain definition address the realities of the drug trade as it exists on
the streets.
Returning to the analogous Egyptian tale, it is clearly illogical for Annubis to
weigh the entire body against a single feather to render a person's final judgment.
The relevant measurement of guilt or innocence is the heart, and only its weight
need be considered. Congress, the Sentencing Commission and the Supreme
Court have determined that pure narcotics and their carrier agents are the relevant
components for calculating mandatory minimum drug sentences. To summarize
the analogy with a modified clich6, United States v. Richards is a good case to
throw the body out with the waste water.
Matthew Thomas Geiger
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